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ABSTRACT 
The paper discusses the fundamental relationships be­
tween turbine overspeed and the time constant of the rotor. 
The amount of overspeed is shown to be related not only to the 
time lag of the emergency tripping devices, but also to the 
amount of thermal energy stored in piping to the turbine. 
Methods of protecting against overspeed are described and 
discussed. The use of red1mdant and "fail-safe" designs is given 
as a way of arriving at a system to give reliable protection of the 
turbine against overspeed. 
INTRODUCTION 
A large bucket or a section of a wheel which separates 
from the rotor of an overspeeding steam turbine can penetrate 
the casing wall. Major damage can result to the turbine and to 
.the driven equipment, .with corresponding danger to human 
life, when excessive turbine overspeed occurs. The control of 
and the protection from excessive turbine overspeed is, there­
fore, of major concern to the turbine designer. 
It is the purpose of this paper to discuss the various factors 
taken into account by the turbine design<'<r in arriving at a 
system to give reliable protection of the turbine against over­
speed. 
71 
SPEED OF THE TURBINE 
The magnitude of the problem of overspeed protection 
depends on how fast the turbine can change speed. The ability 
of a turbine to change speed is commonly measured by its time 
constant, Tc. For an instantaneous step change in position of 
the turbine valves, and assuming that speed is a first order 
function of torque, the turbine rotor will change speed in ac­
cordance with 
n = 1 _ €-t/Tc 
where: 
n 
€ 
change in speed, per unit 
2. 71828 
t time, seconds 
Tc time constant, seconds 
(1) 
From the equation it can be seen that when t = Tc, then 
n = 1 _l or n = . 63 . This leads to one definition of rotor € 
time constant. 
"The rotor time constant gives the length of time it 
takes the rotor to reach 63 percent of its total speed 
change due to an instantaneous change in turbine 
valve position. " 
The rate of change of speed at the instant the valve posi­
tion is changed can be found by differentiating equation (1) and 
setting time equal to zero. This results in: 
dn 
= _!_ 
dt Tc (
2) 
From this equation it is seen that dn = 1. 0 when dt = Tc. 
This leads to a second definition of rotor time constant. 
"The rotor time constant gives the length of time it 
would take the rotor to reach 100 percent of its total 
speed change due to an instantaneous change in 
turbine valve position if it continued to change 
speed at its initial rate. " 
Figure 1 shows the change in rotor speed versus time for 
an instantaneous change in turbine inlet valve position. This 
figure illustrates the basis for the two previous definitions of 
rotor time constant. 
The general definition above can be made more illustra­
tive by having the instantaneous valve opening change cor­
responding to a full load change. In this case, the following 
definition applies: 
"The rotor time constant gives the length of time it 
would take the rotor to reach double speed due to a 
100% instantaneous drop in turbine load provided 
the rotor continued to change speed at its initial 
rate. " 
This definition is useful in visualizing and approximating 
what happens in the very short time between loss of load and 
activation of controls and safety devices. If it is assumed that 
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Figure 1. Response of a system tcith a single time constant, Tc. 
Change in speed versus time for an instantaneous change in 
position of the turbine inlet valves. 
steam flow is unchanged and that all relationships are linear, 
then it follows that for an instantaneous change in load and for 
small values of time: 
where: 
t 
or 
..ln = L __!__ 
Tc 
t = ..ln Tc 
L 
time, seconds 
�n = speed change in time "t,'' percent 
Tc = rotor time constant, seconds 
L instantaneous load change, percent 
(3) 
From equation (3) it can be seen that it will take a rotor 
only I� seconds to change speed 10% if there is an instan­
taneous 100% change in load. This is a significant speed change 
that takes place in a very short time. Therefore, extremely fast 
speed controls and emergency overspeed tripping systems are 
required to hold speed rise to a reasonable value on instan­
taneous loss of full load. 
ROTOR TIME CONSTANT VALUES 
Rotor time constant is a basic measure of rotor response. 
The rotor time constant can be obtained from the basic equa­
tion for horsepower by substituting the relationship of speed 
and time for acceleration. The equation for rotor time constant 
is: 
where: 
Tc 
N 
WR2 
H.P. 
Tc = 0.619 [�J 2 [WR2] 
1000 H.P. 
rotor time constant, seconds 
rated speed, rpm 
rotor inertia, lbs-ft2 
rated horsepower 
(4) 
The rotor inertia, WR2, is the only factor in this equation 
that depends on the design of the turbine and, therefore, is not 
known until the design is complete. The WR2 for mechanical 
drive turbines varies over a large range (about 1000/1) but 
tends to have an inverse relationship with speed. Therefore, 
the turbine rotor time constant generally falls in the rather 
narrow range of 2 seconds to 8 seconds with an occasional rotor 
as fast as 0.5 seconds or as slow as 10 seconds. 
Knowledge of the rotor time constant is fundamental to 
the understanding of the total system performance. The speed 
of all controls or relays and the speed of the rate of change of 
load are measured relative to the speed of the rotor. Any 
change which requires more time than about 1/10 of the rotor 
time constant can be considered to be slow. A "slow" relay or 
control tends to be bad while a "slow" load change tends to be 
good. 
LOSS OF LOAD 
Loss of load has been assumed to be "instantaneous" in 
previous discussions. By "instantaneous" it was meant that the 
change took place in zero time. It is obvious that an instanta­
neous load change will result in the maximum change in speed. 
This leads to the question of the difference between speed 
response to an "instantaneous" load change and to a "sudden" 
load change. 
Figure 2 shows the change in speed for an instantaneous 
change in load and for several values of linear ramped changes 
in load, T/Tc. 
T total time for the load change to take place, seconds 
Tc 
t 
rotor time constant, seconds 
time, seconds 
You will note from these curves that the ramped load 
introduces a lag in the rotor speed response. This lag in rotor 
response is approximately equal to one half the ramp time, T, 
for small values of T/Tc. For example, a system with a rotor 
time constant of 5 seconds starts at time zero to have the load 
linearly ramped "suddenly" to a new value of load in one sec­
ond. The change in speed with time will be approximately the 
same as if there had been no load change for the first 1/2 
second and then the load change took place "instantaneously." 
Generator drive machinery can lose full load in a few cy­
cles, or about 1/20 second or less. It is reasonable that these 
turbines should be designed to protect against the instanta­
neous loss of full load. Since this loss in load can occur without 
uncoupling the generator, the rotor time constant includes 
both the turbine and generator WR2• This increases the com­
bined rotor time constant and helps minimize the rotor over­
speed. 
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Figure 2. Response of a system with a single time constant, Tc. 
Change in speed versus time for a linear ramped change in load 
from zero to maximum time, T. 
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The mechanical drive turbine coupled to a pump or a 
compressor is a different matter. The load is not easily discon­
nected. There are only four ways to achieve sudden loss of 
load. The first is to throttle the pump or compressor suction. 
This is not readily accomplished and is only part load reduction 
at most. A flashing pump or a surging compressor may still 
require upward of 30% of full load. More importantly, to throt­
tle a suction requires time, probably a minimum of one or two 
seconds. This is a "slow" action for all except the very slowest, 
10 second turbines. 
The second method of losing load is to break a coupling. 
This method is often referred to in conversations on the over­
speed subje�t. It is, however, extremely rare. The author has 
personal knowledge of only one such coupling break in the past 
35 years. The fact that there was no damaging overspeed to the 
turbine when it occurred leads one to believe that the breaking 
process must have been "slow." There is no data on the sub­
ject. 
The third method of losing load is in process upsets. These 
upsets are generally 20% or less in load occurring over several 
minutes time. This category of upset is extremely "slow" rela­
tive to any turbine rotor time constant and, therefore, of no 
concern relative to turbine overspeed protection. It is possible 
that a process upset could result in a surge in the system. Even 
if such a system surge did dump as much as 70% load in one 
second, this would still be a "slow" action for all except the 
very slowest turbines. 
The fourth is to have a rupture of a compressor discharge 
line. It is conceivable that in the worst case this could result in 
a load loss approaching 100%. This loss in load will not be 
instantaneous but will require time which is a function of the 
system size and pressure levels. 
From the above discussion, it appears reasonably conserv­
ative that mechanical drive turbines be designed to protect 
against excessive overspeed due to a sudden loss of 100% load 
with the sudden load change occurring at a uniform rate in one 
second. Since this loss in load \\>ill occur without uncoupling 
the driven load, the rotor time constant will include both the 
turbine and the driven load WR2• 
DESIGN OVERSPEED 
Overspeed protective devices are generally set to operate 
at about 110% of rated speed. If the speed governor functions 
as specified by NEMA Class D, it will limit the maximum 
speed of the turbine to 107% rated speed when 100% load is 
suddenly reduced to zero. Therefore, as long as the speed 
governor functions properly, the action of the overspeed trip 
will occur only as a result of a slow speed test. This test demon­
strates the function of the parts but does not represent the 
maximum speed excursion that will occur under the actual 
emergency tripping conditions. It is important that the 
maximum speed excursion not damage the rotor. The safe al­
lowable maximum speed will vary from rotor design to design, 
but a usual reasonable maximum would be 125% rated speed. 
At this speed all rotor stresses will be 56% above normal with 
corresponding reductions in design factors of safety. 
OVERSPEED DUE TO TIME LAG 
There are two basic sources of overspeed beyond the 
110% normal emergency tripping speed setting. One of these 
is time lag in the mechanism used to close the trip throttle 
valves to the turbine. The other is the energy available in the 
steam stored between the closing valve and the turbine. 
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Figure 3. Time required for a system with a rotor time con­
stant, Tc, to accelerate from 110% to 125% speed on "sudden" 
loss of 100% load. 
Figure 3 shows the time in which the emergency governor 
must actuate and the trip throttle must close in order to limit 
the maximum overspeed to 125% rated speed. These curves 
are based on the emergency governor being set to operate at 
110% rated speed and they assume that there is no overspeed­
ing from energy of stored steam. They are also based on the 
conservative assumption that the governing valves are inactive 
and that the only speed limitation is by the action of the trip 
throttle valve dosing. Curves are shown for instantaneous loss 
of 100% load and for a uniform rate of load loss to give 100% 
loss in both 0.5 seconds and 1.0 seconds. 
There is no technical problem in providing adequate over­
speed protection for rotors having time constants of two sec­
onds or greater. However, for smaller rotor time constants, the 
reduced closing times required become troublesome. Special 
designs are required to obtain closing times of less than about 
0.3 seconds. 
The fact that it requires some time to lose load is particu­
larly significant to the potential overspeed of turbine rotors 
with low time constants. You can see from Figure 3 that if there 
could be an instantaneous loss of full load on a 1/2 second 
turbine rotor, you would have to close the throttle trip valve in 
0. 08 seconds in order to limit the overspeed to 125%. To 
achieve this small a value of total tripping time is beyond pres­
ent experience. A conservative estimate for mechanical drive 
turbines is that it will take at least one second to lose full load. 
With this load loss you would have to close the throttle trip 
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valve in 0.44 seconds in order to limit the overspeed to 125%. 
This value of total tripping time is practical to achieve. 
OVERSPEED DUE TO STORED ENERGY 
The previous discussion of overspeed due to time lag in 
closing various relays and the trip throttle valve makes the 
assumption that when the valve is closed, all steam to the 
turbine is cut off. This is not true. There is stored energy in the 
steam that exists in the piping and turbine casing between the 
trip throttle valve and the turbine nozzle plate. This steam, as 
well as any steam or water that exists in the casing itself and its 
extraction openings, or connected piping and storage volumes, 
acts to drive the turbine rotor after the trip throttle valve is 
closed. 
The change in speed of the rotor, due to stored steam and 
water, can be found by equating the energy in the steam and 
water to the change in kinetic energy of the rotor. The follow­
ing equation shows the maximum speed that can be reached 
above trip speed due only to stored energy of steam and water. 
This equation is based on a turbine which has 75% efficiency at 
rated steam conditions and rated load. The inlet steam pres­
sure and the turbine efficiency both decrease as the stored 
steam is used. The average effective efficiency of the stored 
steam utilization is approximately 60%. 
where: 
(Nf\ 2 _ l + 2.72 (BTU) 
Nt) WR2(Nt/1000)2 
BTU total stored energy, BTU 
WR2 rotor inertia, lbs-ft 
Nt trip speed, RPM 
Nf maximum speed, RPM 
(5) 
If it is considered that only the inlet piping has stored 
energy, then the above equation can be simplified to show the 
number of feet of piping that is required to store enough 
energy to overspeed the turbine. The following equation shows 
the piping length required to overspeed from a trip speed of 
110% rated speed to a maximum speed of 115% rated speed. 
where: 
p 
Tc 
v 
P :::: 0.095 TcV (6) 
length of inlet pipe between the trip throttle 
valve and turbine, feet 
turbine rotor time constant, seconds 
inlet piping steam velocity, ft/sec 
For a usual inlet piping velocity of 150 ft/sec and fvr a one 
second time constant rotor, it would require the equivalent of 
14 feet of piping between the trip valve and the turbine first 
stage nozzles to overspeed the turbine from 110% trip speed to 
115% maximum speed. 
The steam chest volume plus the volume of the piping 
itself should be considered as the total volume of the equiva­
lent length of piping. 
This result indicates that additional overspeed due to 
stored energy can be appreciable if the trip throttle valve is 
mounted off the turbine, or, as in some designs, there is piping 
between the governing valves in the turbine steam chest and 
the first stage nozzles. 
Stored energy in extraction lines can also be appreciable. 
Non-return valves in extraction lines should be mounted with a 
minimum of piping between them and the turbine casing. In 
general, the total stored energy from all sources should be 
restricted to give an additional overs peed of the turbine of not 
more than 8% or 9% so that when it is combined with the 
overspeed due to time lag of the relays and valves, the total 
overspeed will not exceed 125%. 
A major potential source of stored energy in extraction 
openings is water. \Vater has almost 100 times the stored 
energy of an equal volume of steam at 50 psig. This ratio be­
comes less as the pressure increases such that at 400 psig water 
has only 20 times the stored energy of an equal volume of 
steam. In any event, the high energy level of water emphasizes 
the importance of proper design of extraction piping to provide 
adequate drainage and to avoid pockets where water could 
accumulate. 
OVERSPEED PROTECTION 
There should always be at least two independent methods 
of protecting the turbine against accidental overspeed. The 
speed governor usually acts as one of the methods. The speed 
governor is designed not only to control turbine speed of load, 
but also to limit the turbine speed in case of sudden loss of 
load. The rate of response of these controls may be determined 
by either of these requirements. The rate of response of the 
controls for the "slow" turbine is determined by the stability 
requirements of the system. The "fast" turbine may have the 
rate of response of its controls determined by the need to limit 
overspeed on sudden loss of load. 
The emergency governor (emergency trip) acts as a second 
independent system to limit excessive overspeed. The 
emergency governor is set to operate at a higher speed than 
would be allowed by the speed governor. Therefore, it is ex­
pected to operate only on malfunction of the speed governor. 
The emergency governor function may be either mechanical or 
electrical. 
The mechanical emergency governor has been used for 
many years and is probably the most common application to­
day. It is used when only a single emergency trip function is 
supplied. The electrical emergency governor has experienced 
increased usage in recent years. Both single and dual electrical 
emergency governors have been applied along with the 
mechanical emergency governor to give redundant tripping 
systems. A system of two duplicate but independent 
emergency tripping systems is also used with no mechanical 
emergency governor. When only electrical emergency gover­
nors are used, it is good practice to supply two independent 
emergency tripping systems. 
MECHANICAL TRIP SYSTEM 
The total mechanical system is one in which a spring 
loaded plunger, mounted in the turbine shaft, is actuated by 
overspeed to move a system of linkage and levers to unlatch 
the throttle valve and allow it to close. This system is adequate 
for low rated turbines where the forces involved are small and 
the distances required for the linkage system are short. This 
system becomes increasingly penalized by frictional and iner­
tial forces as the size and loading of the turbine becomes larger. 
In these larger turbines, the mechanical trip system is, in fact, 
a mechanical-hydraulic system. A typical trip system of this 
kind is shown in Figure 4. 
The primary action of the system is that the emergency 
trip plunger overcomes the spring force at trip speed and snaps 
out to strike and open the hydraulic trip valve. This lowers the 
supply oil pressure to the trip throttle valve which unlatches 
and allows the valve to close. The same rapid closing action can 
be obtained on the trip throttle valve by any other fast acting 
RELIABLE OVERSPEED PROTECTION FOR INDUSTRIAL DRIVE TURBINES 75 
HYDRAULIC TRIP VALVE � 
� IT:gj#go� 
lOlL EMERGENCY 
OIL DRAIN T RIP �---;�-DRAIN 
RESET 
VALVE 
.----'----, 
SECONDARY 
TRIP 
SOURCES 
OIL DRAIN 
OIL SUPPLY 
MANUAL 
T RIP 
LEVER 
ORIFICE [j 
TRIP 
THROTTLE 
VALVE 
�� 
0 0 
0 - 0 
0 0 
0 0 
0 0 
HANDWHEEL --c=:�==:::::J 
Figure 4. Schematic representation of a simple mechanical­
hydraulic emergency trip system. 
oil dump valve that is placed in the oil line between the hy­
draulic trip valve and the trip throttle valve. These possible 
additional sources of tripping the turbine are identified on Fig­
ure 4 as Secondary Trip Sources. The two most common sec­
ondary trip functions are for low lube oil pressure and manual 
tripping. Either of these can be done by a direct acting valve or 
by a solenoid actuated valve. A manual trip remote from the 
turbine must be solenoid actuated. A manual trip lever can also 
be built into the trip throttle valve as a totally mechanical 
function rather than a combination hydraulic-mechanical func­
tion. 
The hydraulic trip valve is held closed against a spring by 
unbalanced oil pressure across the valve. Once the valve has 
tripped opened, the spring will hold it open. It can be closed 
by opening the reset valve to put oil pressure on the small 
piston built into the hydraulic trip valve. There is an orificed 
line to drain between the reset valve and the hydraulic trip 
valve to prevent accidental pressure existing on the piston 
when the reset valve is closed. The reset valve can be operated 
either manually or remotely. 
The mechanical emergency governor has been used for 
many years and has been developed to a high degree of reliabil­
ity. It has, however, certain disadvantages which are: 
Trip settings cannot be changed in operation. 
Can be tested only at relatively high speeds. 
Redundancy is not feasible. 
It has moving and wearing parts. 
The plunger and spring design of the emergency trip is 
such that higher trip speeds require increasingly smaller 
plunger weights and relatively larger spring gradients. Thus, as 
the trip speed increases, the sensitivity of the trip increases. 
By sensitivity, is meant the change in trip speed for a given 
movement of the plunger. In some high speed trips, the trip 
speed will change over 100 rpm for less than one mil move­
ment of the plunger. The high speed trips are, therefore, more 
difficult to manufacture and to set, and will have more spread 
in their trip settings than lower speed trips. 
The electric trip system does not have the disadvantages 
which are listed for the mechanical emergency governor and, 
of course, it has no plunger and spring for a primary source of 
speed sensing. Like all designs, it has its own evaluation which 
will be discussed below. 
ELECTRIC TRIP SYSTEM 
The electric trip system is different from the mechanical 
trip system in that the functions of the emergency trip and the 
hydraulic trip valve are performed electrically. The other parts 
in the system can be the same. A single electrical trip system in 
its simplest form is shown in Figure 5. An oil actuated stop 
valve is shown in this figure, but a trip throttle valve as shown 
in Figure 4 could have been used. 
In the electrical system, the speed is sensed by a magnetic 
pickup located in proximity to the teeth of a wheel mounted on 
the turbine shaft. The magnetic pickup generates a voltage and 
its frequency is a function of speed and the number of teeth on 
the wheel. The relay tachometer converts the alternating por­
tion of this input signal into a D.C. analogue voltage which is 
proportional to speed. The D.C. analogue voltage is compared 
to a "set" voltage, adjustable from the power source, and a 
switch is actuated when the "set" voltage is reached or ex­
ceeded. The switch actuates the solenoid valve to dump the oil 
and close the trip throttle valve. Once the relay tachometer has 
actuated the trip switch, it will remain in that position until a 
reset button is pushed and a predetermined lower speed has 
been reached. 
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Figure 5. Schematic representation of  a simple electr ic­
hydraulic emergency trip system. 
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Figure 7. Schematic of dual electrical system for overspeed trip 
modified to safeguard against missing frequency signals. 
This fundamentally simple electrical system can be used 
with great flexibility to supply redundant, fail-safe tripping sys­
tems with features to detect faults in the system and to test its 
function. 
DUAL ELECTRIC SYSTEMS 
It is good engineering practice to have the additional re­
liability of a dual electrical trip system. The arrangement of 
such a dual system is shown in simple form in Figure 6. Both 
magnetic pickups are generally mounted to sense speed from 
the same toothed wheel on the turbine shaft. The two switches 
and the two solenoids are both arranged in parallel so that the 
signal from either pickup #lor pickup #2 may actuate either 
or both solenoids. The solenoids act to dump the oil and close 
the turbine stop valve. With this parallel arrangement, a fail­
ure may occur in any single electrical part and still allow the 
proper functioning of the trip system. 
The two solenoid trip valves may both be used to actuate 
(trip closed) the same inlet stop valve or they may each actuate 
a separate stop valve. General practice is to use a single stop 
valve, but dual stop valves have been used where maximum 
protection against overspeed is required or dual steam sources 
are employed. 
FAIL-SAFE 
All turbine overspeed trip designs should be made to 
"fail-safe." The turbine manufacturer considers the design to 
be "fail-safe" when a failure in the system causes the turbine to 
shut down. This gives maximum protection to the turbine. 
Consideration of possible failure modes makes necessary 
additional circuits in the simplified dual electrical system 
shown in Figure 6. 
MISSING SPEED SIGNAL 
A circuit is introduced to notify and to protect against 
missing speed signals. A schematic of how this is done is shown 
in Figure 7. When there is no or very low frequency signal 
from the pickup, the corresponding "missing signal" switch is 
closed. The two missing signal switches are placed in series 
with each other but in parallel with the overspeed switches. 
Therefore, when both missing signal switches are closed, a 
circuit is completed that energizes the solenoids and trips the 
turbine stop valve. A single missing signal will not trip the stop 
valve. However, when that missing signal switch is closed, it 
also closes a circuit to give an alarm (not shown) to notifY 
operating personnel that there is a malfunction in that circuit. 
LOSS OF POWER 
The solenoid should be de-energized to trip in order to 
meet the turbine manufacturer's "fail-safe" criteria. Then any 
failure of the power system, the wiring up to the solenoid or 
the solenoid itself will cause the solenoid to actuate and trip the 
turbine stop valve. A careful review of both solenoid and ac­
tuating switches should be made to see that they can accom­
modate the full energizing current to the solenoid on a con­
tinuous basis. 
This "fail-safe" mode of operation raises the possibility of a 
system malfunction in which the actuating switches which have 
been improperly selected fail to operate because they have 
become fused shut by the continuous passing of solenoid ac­
tuating current. Concern with this possibility has resulted in 
trip systems in which the solenoids are designed to energize to 
trip. When this is done, it is necessary to add a "loss of power" 
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circuit which will independently dump the oil and close the 
turbine stop valve whenever the power source to the regular 
solenoid trips is interrupted. While this circuit protects from 
failure of the power system, it does not protect from failure in 
the wiring up to the solenoid or failure of the solenoid itself. 
LOW OIL SUPPLY 
The trip system should be "fail-safe" not only electrically 
but also hydraulically. The stop valve is spring loaded and 
requires oil pressure to open. Loss of oil supply pressure will 
cause the trip throttle or stop valve to close. Tripping the 
turbine out of service as a result of low oil pressure is accom­
plished by either or both of the following methods: 
The turbine stop valve may be equipped with an oil relay 
valve that latches at normal supply oil pressure but which 
opens at about 35 psig, dumping the oil under the piston 
to drain, and closing the stop valve. 
The lube oil pressure is monitored by a pressure sensitive 
switch which closes at a set pressure below the normal safe 
valve to actuate the solenoid valve and to dump the oil and 
close the turbine stop valve. The low lube oil pressure 
system also includes an alarm which is activated at a 
higher pressure than will actuate the tripping mechanism. 
OTHER ALARM AND TRIP SYSTEMS 
Any number of other trip or alarm and trip systems may 
be used. These systems can be all placed in parallel so that any 
one of them will actuate the solenoids to dump the oil and close 
the turbine stop valve. A listing of the various factors that are 
usually considered for purposes of alarm or trip is given in API 
612. 
STOP VALVE 
The "fail-safe" design feature of the stop valve has already 
been discussed. All of the previous discussion of systems and 
their speed of response is based on the assumption that the 
stop valve will go closed when it gets the signal to do so. The 
fact that this does not always happen has led to the occasional 
use of dual stop valves. The primary reason that stop valves do 
not close is that they have become fouled with carry-over in the 
steam. There are two design features which protect against 
fouling. One of these is the stem seal. This design feature is 
depicted in the stop valve sketch in Figure 5. A small valve 
becomes solidly seated when the stop valve is full open. It 
takes the full load of the oil pressure on the stop valve piston. 
When the stop valve is open there is no steam leakage along 
the valve stem and, therefore, there is no chance of fouling 
deposit in the close clearances between the valve stem and its 
bushing which is outside the regular steam path. 
A second design feature is that of being able to "exercise" 
the stop valve during normal turbine operation. The stop valve 
is designed so that it can be moved through about the upper 
30% of its stroke. This "exercising" should be done on a regular 
monthly basis to give some assurance that deposits have not 
built up excessively on that portion of the valve stem which is 
exposed to the inlet steam and that the trip system operates 
normally. 
A schematic of the exercise feature is shown in Figure 8. 
The "Block" valve is closed first to isolate the stop valve. The 
"Exercise" valve is then opened and the solenoid trip is ac-
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Figure 8. Schematic of stop valve "exercise" system. 
tuated by electrically simulating a speed increase. This drops 
the pressure under the piston and allows it to move until it 
covers the opening in the cylinder wall that is piped to the 
exercise valve. A reversal of this procedure restores the stop 
valve to its normal function. This procedure not only protects 
against valve stem fouling, but it also gives a test of the com­
plete trip system including relay tachometer, trip solenoid and 
stop valve, with exception of the speed pickup. 
SUMMARY 
To give reliable protection of the turbine against over­
speed requires fast acting, dependable designs of tripping sys­
tems that can be tested with the turbine in operation. 
The speed with which the emergency trip system must act 
to limit overspeed to a safe value is a function of the accelera­
tion of the turbine on loss of load. 
The acceleration of the turbine on loss of 100% load is a 
function not only of the time constant of the rotor, but also of 
the rate at which the load is lost. 
Stored energy in steam and water contained in the piping 
to the turbine can cause appreciable overspeed and should be 
considered in the design. 
The emergency trip system should take into account all 
possible modes of failure and should be designed to "fail-safe." 
Redundant electrical hydraulic systems are available that 
can provide protection not only against overspeed, but also can 
act to shut down the turbine for any specified malfunction of 
either the turbine or the process in which it is used. 
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